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Abstract 
The increasing development of offshore wind parks in the European offshore territory may lead to 
meshed offshore grids in which each wind park might be connected to several countries. Such offshore 
grids could be subject to various regulatory regimes, depending on the degree of cooperation between 
the respective countries. This study focuses on how investors in wind parks and transmission systems 
are affected by the choice of regulatory regime in offshore grids with one to four countries connected. 
In order to capture the uncertainties related to the exposure to market prices as well as risks related to 
line failures, we develop a stochastic model for an exemplary wind park and offshore grid. This yields 
the real option values of operational flexibility from additional connections. Simulation results show 
that the choice of regulatory regime, including market access and pricing rules, can have a significant 
impact on the value of a wind park and on the value of the interconnection capacity in the offshore 
grid. The impact can both be positive and negative, implying a complex incentive structure for the 
involved actors. If contrary effects are not reflected in the remuneration level of a wind park, for 
example in the price premium level, investment incentives could either be diminished or the wind park 
could incur windfall profits. Both cases are socio-economically suboptimal as they may pose 
additional cost to the system. Policy makers should consider these findings when designing the 
regulatory regime and level of support in an offshore grid in order to maintain an effective and 
efficient development of offshore wind in Europe. 
Keywords 
Economic impact analysis; Offshore grids; Offshore wind; Regulatory regime 
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1. Introduction* 
Offshore wind energy is one of the cornerstones for achieving a higher share of renewable energy 
sources (RES) in a number of coastal European countries. Until now, the connection of offshore wind 
parks is mainly pursued from a national approach. However, with the increasing number of offshore 
wind parks in the European offshore territory, the interconnection of offshore wind parks in meshed 
offshore grids with simultaneous connection to more than one country is coming more and more into 
focus. An early example is the Kriegers Flak project in the Baltic Sea where Denmark, Germany and 
possibly Sweden at a later stage collaborate on a common offshore node. Similar projects are also 
under discussion for the Irish Sea and for the North Sea. A study on the latter demonstrated that a 
common connection of offshore wind parks as well as further connections between them can lead to 
large cost savings and extra benefits from electricity transmission of up to 21 billion Euro for the 
North Sea region (deDecker and Kreutzkamp, 2011). 
An offshore grid would enable a joint system optimisation across wind parks, interconnections and 
electricity markets. This is expected to be of socio-economic benefit, amongst others thanks to 
infrastructure cost reductions, increase in security of supply for all participating countries, 
enhancement of trade between markets, and benefits from an improved market integration of the 
fluctuating wind energy (deDecker and Kreutzkamp, 2011). 
Offshore grids could be subject to various regulatory regimes, depending on the preferences as well 
as the degree of cooperation between the participating countries. More specifically, the countries 
would have to agree on the regulation of market access for the interconnected offshore wind parks and 
would have to design the pricing rules. Also the level of cooperation regarding renewable support and 
in some cases the choice of support scheme for the offshore area are to be considered. 
Research in the field of offshore grids for wind energy is increasing: beside the aforementioned 
study by deDecker and Kreutzkamp (2011), research is undertaken on technical level, e.g. by 
Trötscher and Korpås (2011) regarding an optimal topology of an offshore network, as well as on 
regulatory level, where Roggenkamp et al. (2010) analyse offshore electricity grids and their potential 
implementation in respect to market and regulatory aspects. Woolley et al. (2012) analyse legal 
aspects of offshore grids, including the cases where an offshore wind park is in addition to its ‘home’ 
country also connected to one other, and where it forms part of a meshed offshore grid. Schröder 
(2012) shows that participation in national balancing markets constitutes a main part of the economic 
attractiveness of an offshore wind park and that an interconnection to several markets will impact the 
business case. 
Most of these analyses deal with offshore grids from a macroscopic perspective. There is however 
a certain lack of understanding as of how the market actors, especially the investors in offshore wind 
parks and transmission systems, are affected by the choice of regulatory regime in an offshore grid. 
This understanding is of utmost importance when designing the regulatory regime in order to ensure 
adequate investment incentives for wind parks and transmission capacity. A step towards this 
understanding was taken in an earlier study by the authors (Schröder and Kitzing, 2012) and is further 
elaborated in this paper. We approach the research gap with a real-options approach: we investigate an 
offshore wind park in an offshore grid under different regulatory regimes and support scheme 
constellations, and determine the option value of operational flexibility for additional interconnections. 
                                                     
*
 This study is undertaken in connection with the ENSYMORA project (www.ensymora.dk) with gratefully acknowledged 
funding by the Danish Strategic Research Program. Furthermore, the authors would like to thank the German Federal 
Maritime and Hydrographic Agency (BSH), the Federal Ministry for the Environment, Nature Conservation and Nuclear 
Safety (BMU) and Projektträger Jülich for their coordinated effort on publishing wind data from the FINO1 platform in 
the North Sea. 
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With the further development and extension of the quantitative model, we now address the economic 
impact of different regulatory regimes on the investors and operators of wind parks as well as 
transmission systems. 
Our model shows that there can be both positive and negative effects on the business case of the 
offshore wind park operator. We argue that the specific effects should be considered when choosing 
the regulatory regime and designing the support scheme in the offshore grid, in order to maintain the 
effective and efficient development of offshore wind in Europe. 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: after an explanation of the investigated cases in 
section 0, we address the applied method in section 0. Then we turn to the quantitative results and their 
discussion (sections 0 and 0). The paper concludes with qualitative conclusions and considerations on 
policy options (section 0). 
2. Possible regulatory solutions and pricing schemes in offshore grids 
We investigate a fictive offshore wind park in an offshore grid, connected to between one to four 
archetypical European markets, with regard to different regulatory regimes and support scheme 
constellations. We consider two different support schemes: Feed-in tariffs and price premium 
mechanisms. Under Feed-in tariffs (FIT), a fixed remuneration per MWh is guaranteed and paid to the 
wind park operator for a fixed number of years (or generation hours). Selling the generation on power 
markets and correction of forecast errors is typically administered by the TSO, leaving the wind park 
operator with only limited market risk. Price premium mechanisms, or Feed-in premiums (FIP), are 
typically fixed add-on payments to the market price. The wind park operator has to sell the generated 
electricity on power markets and is exposed to both market price risk and forecast errors. 
Since wind farm operators under feed-in tariffs are not exposed to significant market risk, market 
pricing rules do not play a decisive role in the investment decision. In the case of feed-in premium 
mechanisms, operators are exposed to market price signals and market pricing rules for the offshore 
grid become decisive. In extension to our previous analysis, we distinguish three fundamentally 
different regulatory regimes in terms of market access and spot market pricing rules:  
1. ‘Home’ country: The wind park in the offshore area is assigned to one ‘home’ country and has 
only secondary access to the other connected markets;  
2. ‘Primary access’: the offshore area is flexibly integrated into any of the neighbouring markets, 
so that the wind park operator has access to the respective maximum price;  
3. ‘Offshore hub’: the offshore area forms its own market price area and thus the wind park 
operator is subject to specific nodal pricing. 
The first case depicts a situation of limited cross-country coordination, when for example the 
participating countries would like to benefit from the price-equalising effects of additional 
interconnection capacity between the markets, but are not cooperating at a higher level, such as 
regarding the support scheme. Then, an offshore wind farm would be assigned one ‘home’ country 
into which it would primarily sell the power and receive the support. In case the market price in 
another country happens to be higher than the one of the ‘home’ country plus support, the wind park 
may choose to sell the power in that market. This is socio-economically not an optimal utilisation of 
the interconnection capacity as the price-equalising effect will be distorted by the support level. This 
effect is reflected by lower congestion rents collected by the transmission system operators (TSO). 
The second and the third cases do allow an optimal utilisation of the interconnection capacity, as 
we here assume a support scheme specific for the offshore area, i.e. the wind park would receive a 
price premium no matter in which market the power is sold. The two cases differ in the pricing rules: 
In the second case, the production from the wind park is integrated in one of the neighbouring 
markets, and will receive the price of the respective market. The choice into which market to sell is 
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left to the wind park operator. He will directly sell the produced power into any of the markets via a 
specifically reserved capacity in the interconnectors. The rest of the interconnectors are dispatched in 
implicit auctions. We refer to this case as the ‘primary access’ case.  
In the third case, the offshore grid becomes an integral part of a larger market area with different 
price nodes (such as the Nord pool area), with implicit auctions on the entire interconnection 
capacities, and a separate price that may form in the offshore grid node in case of congestions. The 
offshore wind park operator will always be subject to the price that forms in the offshore node, which 
in many cases is equal to the lowest or a medium price of the neighbouring markets (Schröder and 
Sundahl, 2011). We refer to this case as the ‘offshore hub’ case with nodal pricing. 
The number of countries (and therewith markets) that are participating in the offshore hub with 
respective interconnector capacities are decisive for the attractiveness of investment in an offshore 
wind park. In the benchmark case, only a connection to one market is assumed. We investigate the 
economic impact on the business cases for the wind park and interconnection cables induced by 
additional connections to other markets under all three regulatory regimes. Error! Reference source 
not found. illustrates the different fictive connection situations distinguished in this paper: the 
benchmark case is a 600 MW offshore wind park connected to country A by a cable with the same 
capacity. This connection can be complemented by additional 600 MW interconnectors to the 
neighbouring countries B, C and D. 
Figure 1: Overview of connection options in the considered cases 
 
In addition to the connections, two other parameters are worth investigating: failure risk of any of the 
connections might impact the business cases significantly, depending on the regulatory set-up. 
Especially relevant for the stochastic analysis and therewith the option value is the strength of price 
correlation between the investigated markets. 
The above considerations lead us to the following cases we investigate during the remainder of the 
paper: 
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Table 1: Overview of the analysed cases and their main distinguishing characteristics 
Benchmark
Geographical area Country A
Renewable 
Support
Feed-in tariff
Feed in Premium
Applicable
price areas
Country A
Special events -
‘Home’ country case Primary access case Offshore hub case
Countries A + B, C, D
Feed-in Premium 
(in Country A) 
Country A, and
very high prices 
in countries B to D
Line Failures
High market correlations
Special cases
Feed-in Premium 
(joint scheme) 
Highest prices of 
countries A to D
Offshore price node (typically median of 
prices in countries A to D)
 
In order to capture the uncertainties related to the exposure of the offshore wind park to market price 
fluctuations under a price premium scheme and to integrate line failures into our considerations, a 
stochastic model is applied for the quantitative analysis. We use a real-options approach where any 
additional value related to the operational flexibility of being connected to other countries is regarded 
as the option value of the additional interconnection. 
3. Method 
Market prices of the different markets are modelled as stochastic mean reverting Wiener processes, 
following well-established methods. Stochastic line failures are reflected by the authors’ own 
approach, inspired by previous modelling of jump processes in commodity prices (see e.g. Hambly et 
al., 2009). We then compare the mean expected value of a wind park and its standard deviation in the 
different cases of regulatory regimes and country-connections to the benchmark case. This benchmark 
case is a wind park connected to one country only. At the same time, changes in congestion rents 
obtained by the involved TSOs for the different cases are analysed. 
3.1 A stochastic model for the value of a wind park under price uncertainty 
We use a well-established and often used approach (based on Dixit and Pindyck, 1994) to develop a 
stochastic model of the spot electricity price in four countries, where electricity prices are a stochastic 
process following a Brownian motion. The stochastic behaviour of prices, including drift and 
volatility, are exogenously given to the model. It has often been shown that most commodities in 
general and electricity prices specifically show characteristics of mean reversion and seasonal patterns 
(Lucia and Schwartz, 2002). Considering the nature of the analysis, which is a comparison of different 
cases with the same underlying market price processes, we include mean reversion in the model, as it 
will indeed affect the results, especially because the cases are sensitive to small price differences 
between the countries. Seasonal patterns however are not expected to modify the comparative 
attractiveness of the cases significantly, as they would apply similarly to all countries. Therefore, 
seasonal patterns are not included in the model. The price processes are modelled as plain mean 
reverting Wiener processes after Dixit and Pindyck (1994). The stochastic change of price in each time 
step  is expressed with the mean reverting stochastic process: 
   (1) 
Where: 
 is a Wiener process with independent increments at 
  
   is the mean reversion factor of the market (exogenously given) 
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  is the standard deviation of the market (exogenously given) 
 is the ‘normal’ level of the price , to which it tends to revert, i.e. the long-run marginal cost 
of production in an electricity system 
The processes are Markovian, meaning that the distribution of future prices is only dependent on the 
present price and not the past history of prices, i.e. it follows fundamental signals. In this framework, 
the price  in each time step can be calculated from the previous price plus the expected change  
from a stochastic process: 
  (2) 
For the simulation, we use the related first-order autoregressive process in discrete time (see Dixit and 
Pindyck, 1994, p. 76): 
  (3) 
Where: 
 is the ‘normal’ level of , to which it tends to revert.  includes a drift in the process and is 
therewith also dependent on  
  is a normally distributed random variable with mean of zero and variance of 
   (4) 
Having the stochastic price processes for all four countries in place, we then model the hourly 
expected future cashflows of the wind park mainly dependent on revenues from sales into the different 
spot market based on the restrictions given by the different cases we investigate. Next, future 
cashflows are aggregated over the analysis period, i.e. the lifetime of the wind project, and a 
traditional discounted cashflow calculation is undertaken to determine the project value, here 
expressed as the internal rate of return in each scenario and each realisation of the stochastic price 
process (Brealey and Myers, 2002). 
 
  (5) 
Where: 
IRR is the internal rate of return in each realisation of the price processes in each scenario 
NPV is the net present value of the wind park 
  is net cashflow in period t (net of positive and negative cashflows) 
   is the time period of the Cashflow 
   is Number of periods, i.e. the lifetime of the wind park  
Mean and standard deviation of the net present value of the project for the different cases are 
determined by a Monte Carlo simulation (N=1,000) capturing different realisations of the price 
processes. 
3.2 A model for stochastic line failures 
Stochastic line failures are added as an optional choice to the model. We model the probability of 
occurrence of a line failure with a Poisson distribution , which reflects the nature of the failures 
much better than e.g. a normal distribution. This modelling approach is comparable to modelling of 
jump processes in commodity prices (see for example Hambly et al., 2009). The probability of 
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duration of the line failure is modelled as a normal distribution . We also add an exponential 
recovery process for the available capacity  when ramping up after the line failure, approaching 
exponentially to the maximum available capacity , the nominal capacity of the interconnection 
capacity between the wind park and the respective country. 
  (6) 
Where: 
 is the value of available interconnection capacity, being restricted to   
  is the nominal capacity, i.e. the maximum available interconnection capacity between the 
wind park and the respective country. It also serves here as the jump size in the Poisson 
process, meaning that the failure is expected to affect 100% of the capacity 
 is the recovery rate of the exponential process towards the maximum available capacity  
 is the variable that activates the line failure, with  
 
  is a Poisson distributed random variable with mean of  ,  
   is reflecting the expected number of line failures per year 
 is the variable that activates the recovery process after an outage, with 
 
   is the maximum value of , in which a line failure last occurred, with  
  is a normally distributed random variable with mean of zero and standard deviation of , 
 
   is reflecting the expected number of hours the outage lasts 
3.3 Assumptions 
As described in a previous section, we investigate a fictive case with four archetypical markets and a 
typically sized offshore wind farm of 600 MW. We assume the addition of 600 MW interconnectors to 
other countries as main distinction criterion between the cases. This has a crucial effect on results: the 
capacity of the wind farm is such that typically all its power can be sold into one market. Other 
capacity combinations, especially combined with different electricity price characteristics in the 
neighbouring countries, would most likely have a considerable impact on the results. This issue is 
dealt with in a sensitivity calculation, where we vary the connection capacity. 
The electricity price processes for all four countries (see section 0) are assumed to share the same 
fictive stochastic parameters. The starting mean value is assumed at 50 Euro/MWh with a drift of +1 
Euro/MWh towards the end of each year. The volatility is expressed as a standard deviation before 
mean reversion at 1.5 Euro/MWh, while the mean reversion coefficient κ is set at 0.01. Markets are 
non-correlated, except for one special case, where the effect of high market correlation is analysed by 
assuming a correlation of 0.9 of market A with B, C and D. 
Regarding the stochastic line failures (see section 0) we assume that on average three annual 
interruptions occur with a normally-distributed duration with expected 50 hours per outage. The line 
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failures are assumed to occur with a Poisson-distributed frequency with a λ of 3. The spike mean 
reversion parameter κ, reflecting the speed of return to nominal capacity after a line outage, is set at 
0.05. The average failure duration of 150 hours per year corresponds to 1.7% outage per year, which is 
regarded to lie in a realistic range (Lindén et al., 2010 and Waterworth et al., 1998). 
Figure 2: Exemplary outage results for the four interconnectors over a full year 
0
200
400
600
MW
 
The wind time series is based on measured wind data at the FINO1 platform in the South-Western part 
of the German sector of the North Sea for the year 2006. It has been processed into an hourly 
production pattern accordingly to Nørgaard et al. (2004) and approximately adjusted for wake effects. 
The 600 MW offshore wind park is assumed to have a lifetime of 25 years, about 4,475 full load 
hours, investment cost of 2.45 million Euro/MW and operational expenditure of 0.07 million 
Euro/MW/year. These assumptions on the offshore wind park are based on ENS (2010). Apart from 
the rather high value for full load hours derived from wind time series, these numbers are in line with 
Deloitte (2011) and assessed to be realistic for the nearest years to come. 
4. Quantitative results 
The quantitative results we obtain and discuss further are different for wind park and transmission 
system operators. For the offshore wind park, the Internal Rate of Return (IRR) represents the value of 
the wind park and therewith the investment incentive. We consider the expected mean IRR and the 
standard deviation of the IRR from the Monte Carlo simulations. For the TSO, the income from the 
interconnection operations forms the basis to evaluate the interconnections and therewith the 
investment incentive in additional cables. The TSO collects the income as congestion revenues, also 
called congestion rents, which are income from price differences on the participating spot markets and 
the implicit energy flows between them. We consider the expected annual mean congestion revenues 
as well as their standard deviation derived in the same Monte Carlo simulations as for the wind park. 
4.1 One country – benchmark case 
In the benchmark case, the offshore wind park is only connected to one country and is thus fully 
integrated into that one market. In case the wind park receives a guaranteed price in form of a feed-in 
tariff, the wind park is not exposed to the volatility of that market and all Monte Carlo simulations 
result in the same IRR for the wind park (see Figure 3, left). In case of a fixed price premium paid out 
in addition to the market price, the wind park is exposed to the underlying volatility and the Monte 
Carlo simulations yield a normally distributed outcome of the IRR (Figure 3, right). We have designed 
the cases in such way that the expected mean IRRs for feed-in tariffs and premiums are the same in the 
benchmark case, namely 9.8%. The difference in attractiveness of the two cases lies in the different 
standard deviation – The higher the standard deviation, the higher the riskiness of the project. The 
Feed-in premium case yields in a standard deviation of 0.4%-points. This result forms the basis of 
comparison for our further analyses. 
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Figure 3: Wind park IRR for feed-in tariff support (left) and price premium support (right) 
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The congestion revenues for the TSO are assumed to be zero in the benchmark case, meaning that we 
only consider and compare the additional income generated by the new cross-border connections in 
the offshore hub in the two to four country cases. 
4.2 Home country case 
In this case, the offshore wind farm has primary access to its home country – where it is remunerated 
at the market price plus a price premium – and secondary access to the other countries, where it is only 
remunerated at the respective market prices. Quantitative results are depicted in Figure 4 and show 
that the average IRR increases with the number of markets while the standard deviation decreases. The 
average IRR can be increased from 9.8% under the connection to one country up to 10.3% under the 
connection to four countries. The marginal benefit of each additional connection is decreasing. In 
addition to an increase in IRR, the standard deviation, which we use as indication for riskiness of the 
investment, decreases when adding more countries, in our simulations from 0.4%-points in the 
benchmark case to 0.32%-points in the four country case. 
Figure 4: Wind farm IRR (left) and TSO congestion rents (right) in the home country case 
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Considering congestion rents (Figure 4, right), they increase with each additional connection and 
exceed the level achieved under primary market access by approximately 10 million Euro. The 
volatility, expressed as standard deviation of the congestion rents, increases from 4.3 to 6.3 million 
Euro when changing from two to three connected countries. Continuing to four connected countries, a 
further increase to 7.5 million Euro can be observed. 
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4.3 Primary market access 
In cases where primary access is chosen as regulatory framework, the wind park operator has full 
benefit from the additional connections, whereas the TSO can only use the residual capacity. The wind 
park can choose into which market it sells the electricity and can therewith achieve a higher income 
from choosing the highest price at any point in time – the more countries are connected, the higher the 
value of the wind park (see Figure 5, left). 
As already shown in Schröder and Kitzing (2012), the option to be connected to different countries 
increases the value of the wind park significantly. The value of the wind park is here expressed as 
mean expected IRR and increases with up to 33% in the four-country case compared to the benchmark 
case (up from 9.8% to 13.0%) when assuming a constant feed-in premium. In addition to an increase 
in IRR, the standard deviation decreases more than in the home country case, in our simulations with 
up to 42% (down from 0.4% to 0.24%). This is due to the fact that the wind park is less exposed to the 
volatility of market prices in one country as it has the option to switch sales to any other country 
whenever a low price period occurs. We conclude that the wind park operator will in this regulatory 
regime benefit from any additional connections: he can expect a higher IRR and at the same time a 
risk reducing effect. The risk-reducing effect is increased when taking line failures into account, 
whereas the expected project value and the risk reducing effect is decreased when considering 
correlation between the market prices of the participating markets. In our example, the IRR decreased 
by 0.6%-points when considering a two-variate correlation of all countries with country A. 
Figure 5: Wind farm IRR (left) and TSO congestion rents (right) in the primary access case 
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For all interconnector capacity that is not utilised by the wind park operator, the TSO collects 
congestion revenues from price differences in the adjacent markets. Figure 5 shows the expected 
amounts and probability distributions for this income. Compared to the two-country case, the expected 
income increases with 119% in our simulations (+58 million Euro) when adding one more country, 
and yet another 61 million Euro to 167 million Euro with addition of the fourth country. This is due to 
the fact that in the chosen set-up, single interconnectors have the same capacities and an even number 
assures a better asset utilisation than an odd number of lines. As an example, in periods without wind 
generation, one interconnector can export while another one imports. In a three-country case, this 
leaves the third interconnector idle. In a four-country case, the constellation is symmetrical again. 
Regarding volatilities, it becomes apparent from the simulations that – contrarily to the wind park 
operator – the TSO faces higher volatility in income when more countries are connected to the 
offshore hub. This is the case for markets with no or low correlation, since the additional volatility of 
each market adds to the overall fluctuation in price differences, which is the major income source for 
congestion rents. In a situation where the adjacent markets are highly correlated, both the level of 
income and the standard deviation decrease significantly. 
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4.4 Offshore price hub 
In cases where the regulatory framework constitutes an offshore hub which forms its own price area, 
the wind park operator will not be able to choose on which market to sell his production. The offshore 
wind park will be subject to the price that forms in the offshore hub. This price is dependent on the 
price levels and price differences in the neighbouring markets as well as the overall available 
interconnection capacity. The flow in the connections from the wind park and the different countries is 
determined in implicit auctions. In almost all realistic situations, there will be at least one connection 
from the wind park to a country which is not congested, and the offshore hub price will thus equal the 
price of that market. This will typically not be the highest available price (Schröder and Sundahl, 
2011). Therefore, the wind park will be valued at a lower level than in the case of primary access. 
As was discussed in Schröder and Kitzing (2012), the model results reveal an interesting 
characteristic of how this regulatory framework impacts the wind park under the assumption of 
identical interconnector capacities. When two countries are connected to the offshore price hub, the 
hub will always form a price that corresponds to the lower of the two prices; therefore the impact is 
very significant with a decrease of ca. 15% (from 9.8% to 8.4%). In a case of three countries, the 
offshore price hub will form a price that corresponds to the median of all three prices. Some of the 
impact of the two-country case is mitigated. In a four country case, however a price will form that 
corresponds to the second lowest of the four market prices. In terms of riskiness of the project, i.e. 
standard deviation, the different country-cases show similar distributions as with primary access – a 
higher number of countries coincides with a lower standard deviation. The resulting IRR probability 
distributions are illustrated in Figure 6. The differences of the cases are much less pronounced if there 
is significant price correlation between the markets of the countries especially when including periods 
of equal prices. 
Figure 6: Wind farm IRR (left) and TSO congestion rents (right) in the offshore hub case 
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In the case of nodal pricing in an offshore hub, the TSO has access to the full interconnection capacity 
as the production and energy flows from the wind park is integrated in the overall market. Therefore, 
the TSO is able to collect more congestion revenues – the increase is in fact the same amount of 
revenues that the wind park operator loses in the offshore hub regime compared to primary access. 
The annual revenues lie in our simulations for each country-constellation 45-52 million Euros higher 
than in the primary access case. 
It can be noted that the two-country case, which is the least attractive for the wind park operator is 
not the best case for the TSO, as the TSO’s revenues increase with addition of more countries simply 
because more energy flow becomes possible. Also, the connection to a fourth country is not beneficial 
for the wind park operator, where it is for the TSO. In these cases, opposing interests of wind park 
operator and TSO could hamper the (further) construction of an offshore hub.  
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4.5 Special case: line failures 
Line failures are a special case for this analysis, as the loss caused by line outages is a real reduction in 
energy flows between countries. Here again, it is a question of the regulatory framework in who is 
exposed to a potential loss from line failures – the wind park operator or the TSO. If the wind park 
operator is not compensated for line failures of the offshore cables, he bears risk of income loss from 
not being able to sell the power he produces. Figure Figure 77 shows this situation for connection to 
one country on the left. If the wind park is connected to additional countries (each having similar risk 
of line failure) and has access to any of the other markets, then the wind park is less exposed to 
income loss the more countries are added, because it becomes less probable that all lines fail at the 
same time. Figure 7 shows that the income risk is nearly fully mitigated by four connections. This 
finding is in line with Macharey et al. (2012), who analyse possible interconnections between single 
German offshore wind clusters and conclude that meshed offshore structures can, even within one 
price zone, have a considerably risk-reducing effect and be profitable. 
Figure 7: IRR probability distribution changes for the wind park considering line failures 
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This result can be of significant impact for the future valuation of wind parks in offshore hubs, 
especially in a regulatory regime with offshore hub pricing – the risk reducing effect on line failures 
might mitigate some of the disincentives for offshore wind park operators in the construction of an 
offshore hub. However, in a regulatory regime where wind park operators are fully or partly 
compensated for line outages, there will be no measurable or only limited impact on the wind park 
value. Here, the income for the TSO will, in addition to the losses from foregone congestion revenues, 
also be affected from the compensation payments for the wind park operator. 
4.6 Comparison of all cases and sensitivity analysis 
The overall comparison of all cases as illustrated in Figure 8 displays that wind park investors and the 
TSO have opposing preferences in regards to the regulatory regime. The TSO benefits clearly from a 
nodal pricing system in the offshore hub (all ‘offshore hub’ cases (yellow triangles) have the highest 
mean congestion revenues), whereas the wind park operator would prefer a regime with primary 
market access (green squares). Line failures have a much lower impact on cases than a high market 
price correlation (both special cases are connected to their respective reference cases by lines). 
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Figure 8: Overview of all case results for the offshore wind park (left) and the TSO (right) 
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The difference between primary access and nodal pricing is least pronounced for the three-country 
case: here, the primary access and nodal pricing cases differ only by 41 million Euro on average. The 
reason is a comparatively good case for the wind park under nodal pricing, which is at the expense of 
congestion rent income. This illustrates that option values between several cases are highly dependent 
on the underlying assumptions. 
A sensitivity analysis for changed line capacities under nodal pricing shows that the wind farm’s 
IRR standard deviation is only affected marginally, whereas the average return increases especially 
with the upgrade to 1,200 MW (Figure 9, left). This is due to the fact that, starting with the benchmark 
value of 600 MW for all cables, the connection to one country has been increased in steps of 200 MW 
until 1,200 MW. Reaching 1,200 MW, the interconnection corresponds to two other interconnectors 
leading to a new price formation constellation, which explains the major difference to a capacity of 
1,000 MW. Regarding the congestion rents (Figure 9Figure 9, right), the result fits with the 
expectation that additional interconnection yields decreasing marginal benefits. 
Figure 9: Wind farm IRR (left) and TSO congestion rents (right) for changed line capacities 
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5. Analysis and discussion 
The investigated cases do not represent real conditions in terms of markets or technical options, but 
they carry some pure and archetypical characteristics of conditions for potential offshore grids in the 
European offshore territory. Therewith, they can serve as basis for the main points we wish to 
highlight. The results from the simulations show that the choice of regulatory regime has a decisive 
impact on the value of a wind park investment as well as for the income for transmission system 
operators. The impact can be both positive and negative for the different actors. Overall, we observe 
that the choice of regulatory regime in comparable cases, i.e. the primary access and the offshore hub 
case (with the same structure of RES support), has a re-allocative effect of benefits between the actors 
rather than creation of additional benefits. As long as connection capacities and market prices do not 
change between the cases, the aggregated benefits including the sale of wind power production and 
price differences between markets are the same. In case of primary access, more of the benefits are 
allocated to the wind park operators, and in the offshore hub with nodal pricing, more income is 
allocated to the TSO. Both regimes are feasible – it is a policy choice which regime should be 
implemented. In this regard, some considerations should be made. 
First, offshore wind park are and will for the near future be dependent on financial support by 
specific instruments such as Feed-in tariffs of Feed-in premiums. If a regulatory regime is chosen that 
exposes the investor in offshore wind parks to market risk and at the same time to nodal pricing in the 
offshore hub, there is a significant risk of lower IRR when additional countries are added to the 
offshore hub. The attractiveness of investment is consequently decreased. In order to trigger an 
adequate amount of investment, the level of support needs to be increased. The higher support level 
could be paid from the additional congestion rents that the TSO incurs. By contrast, if a primary 
access regime is established, the wind park operator could benefit from significant windfall profits 
when additional countries connect into the offshore grid. To avoid socio-economically overly 
expensive support mechanisms, the level of support should be corrected downwards for each new 
country in the offshore grid. 
Second, the level of cooperation between the countries needs to be taken into consideration. It will 
not always be possible to create an offshore hub with nodal pricing due to the high level of 
coordination. If one country has a well-established national Feed-in tariff system, only a strong ‘home’ 
country affiliation seems to be practically possible. However, an offshore hub regime with nodal 
pricing could especially become interesting for internationally coordinated support schemes in the 
future to ensure neutrality between the neighbouring countries (see Schröder et al., 2011).  
In addition, the sensitivity analysis on interconnector capacities to different markets shows that 
quantitative results exhibit remarkable differences if the connection to one country reaches an integer 
multiple capacity of the capacities towards other countries. It should be emphasised that this also 
depends on the assumed generation time series and capacities. 
We have limited our analysis to spot markets. In reality, balancing markets and their prices might 
be a very decisive factor in choosing on which market to sell. The cases and countries investigated do 
not represent a realistic market environment. Before drawing conclusions on real-world cases, the 
model should be calibrated to real market characteristics; especially the level and volatility of the 
markets are decisive. This, however, could first be applied for a real-world case where the 
interconnector capacities and market price characteristics are known and where the offshore node’s 
generation is handled differently than national onshore generation. A main simplification is that we 
look at real option values for the whole lifetime of the project. This supports transparency, but would 
probably not apply in real-world cases: additional interconnectors are first decided upon after the 
offshore wind farm comes into operation. So, for more realistic cases, a sensitivity analysis on 
additional interconnectors only after a certain number of years would provide valuable insights. 
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6. Conclusions 
This paper presents an analysis on the economic effects of different regulatory regimes on offshore 
wind parks and transmission system operators in an offshore grid. Stochastic price processes and line 
failures are modelled for four spot markets. An offshore wind farm as part of a meshed offshore grid is 
connected to between one and four of these markets, experiencing different option values of additional 
interconnectors. 
The analysis reveals two major insights: First, we have shown that the regulatory regime, including 
market access and pricing rules, has a significant impact on the valuation of assets in an offshore hub, 
both wind parks and interconnection capacity. The choice of regulatory regime can have both positive 
and negative impact on the actors. In our (fictive) case with connections to four similar archetypical 
power markets, the IRR for an investment in a wind park increases with up to 33% if the wind park 
has primary access to all markets. Contrarily, establishing an offshore hub with nodal pricing can have 
a negative impact on the IRR of up to 15%. So, the incorporation into an offshore grid is far from 
neutral for an offshore wind park. This leads to the question of how to compensate for possible losses 
or gains under the suggested regulatory mechanisms. Our results show this may need to be handled on 
an interconnector-by-interconnector basis: while the connection to a third country is beneficial for the 
offshore wind park under nodal pricing, the connection to a fourth country is negative. 
Second, the incentives for the different market actors in relation to additional connections are very 
different and in some cases even contrary. This is particularly visible for the offshore price hub, where 
the wind farm’s profit increases or decreases depending on the number of the connection to be made. 
It can contrarily still be a good business case to add a cable that is negative from the wind farm’s point 
of view. Thus, the market actors such as transmission system operators and wind farm operators may 
take very different positions towards establishing new connections at different stages in the 
development of meshed offshore grids – which may hamper the construction of new lines that are 
beneficial from a socio-economic perspective. Both effects should be considered in future valuations 
of wind parks and offshore hubs as well as in the design of the regulatory regime for the offshore grid 
and the level of support for the wind park. Only then, an effective and efficient development of 
offshore wind in Europe can be achieved.  
The sensitivity analyses that we have undertaken regarding different interconnection capacities 
shows that minor upgrades for single interconnectors improve the wind farm’s income only 
marginally. A larger improvement is reached when a capacity corresponding to existing capacities 
(600 MW in the example) is added. As expected, the marginal benefit of additional capacity decreases 
from a TSO point of view. 
Our results can be used when considering how to design a cross-border offshore hub, such as 
envisaged in the Kriegers Flak area, to make an informed decision. In order to balance incentives for 
investment and socio-economic efficiency, the support level, i.e. in our case the fixed price premium, 
could be adjusted according to changes in wind park value and riskiness. 
The attractiveness of offshore grids for different market actors depends heavily on the choice of 
regulatory regime, including market access, pricing rules and support. Certain constellations of 
regulatory regimes create barriers that may hamper the development of offshore grids due to diverging 
incentives. If meshed offshore grids are to be built due to their socio-economic benefits, the effects 
described in this study should be taken into consideration when making regulatory choices. 
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